Comment en Implement OAuth 2.0 PKCE Flow

Implement le Proof Clé pour Code Exchange (PKCE) extension en OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code flow pour sûr public client authentication.

问题

Public clients (SPAs, mobile apps) ne peut pas securely stocker un client secret, making them vulnerable en authorization code interception attacks. You besoin en implement PKCE (RFC 7636) en bind le authorization code en un code verifier known seulement en le client.

Prérequis

Understanding of OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code flow
Familiarity with public vs. confidential clients
Knowledge of SHA-256 hashing and Base64URL encoding

Étapes

1. Generate the code verifier and code challenge

Generate a cryptographically random code verifier: a high-entropy string of 43-128 characters from the unreserved character set [A-Z][a-z][0-9]-._~. Then derive the code challenge: S256 method computes BASE64URL-ENCODE(SHA256(ASCII(code_verifier))). The code challenge is sent in the authorization request; the code verifier is kept locally and never sent until the token exchange. Use the random generator for the verifier and SHA-256 + Base64URL for the challenge.
entrée
```
random 32 bytes -> base64url
```
输出
```
verifier: dBjftJeZ4CuK... | challenge: E9Melhoa2l2cYi8Yk... (S256)
```
2. Send the authorization request with code challenge

Redirect the user to the authorization endpoint with parameters: response_type=code, client_id, redirect_uri, scope, state (CSRF protection), code_challenge, code_challenge_method=S256. The authorization server stores the code challenge associated with the issued authorization code. The state parameter must be a random value that the client validates on redirect to prevent CSRF.
entrée
```
GET /authorize?response_type=code&client_id=app1&code_challenge=E9Mel...&code_challenge_method=S256&state=xyz
```
输出
```
redirect: https://app.com/cb?code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA&state=xyz
```
3. Exchange the code with the code verifier

On receiving the authorization code, send a token request to the token endpoint with: grant_type=authorization_code, client_id, code, redirect_uri, code_verifier. The authorization server recomputes BASE64URL(SHA256(code_verifier)) and compares it to the stored code challenge. If they match, the code was not intercepted — issue tokens. If they don't match, reject the request. Use the OAuth token parser to inspect the returned tokens.
entrée
```
POST /token { grant_type, code, code_verifier: dBjftJeZ4CuK... }
```
输出
```
{ access_token, refresh_token, token_type: Bearer, expires_in }
```
4. Validate tokens and secure the state parameter

Validate the state parameter matches the one sent in step 2 to prevent CSRF. Parse the access token (if JWT) to check expiration, issuer, and audience. Store tokens securely: access token in memory, refresh token in secure storage (httpOnly cookie for web, secure enclave for mobile). Never store tokens in localStorage for SPAs. Use the JWT parser to verify token claims before using the token.
entrée
```
access_token: eyJhbGciOi...
```
输出
```
valid: true | exp: 1234567890 | scope: read write
```

Résultat attendu

Un sûr OAuth 2.0 PKCE flow où public clients authenticate sans un client secret, protected against authorization code interception et CSRF attacks.

Erreurs courantes

Using plain code_challenge_method instead of S256: The 'plain' method sends the verifier directly as the challenge, providing no protection if intercepted. Always use S256 (SHA-256 based).
Code verifier too short or not cryptographically random: The verifier must be 43-128 characters of high entropy. Use a CSPRNG (crypto.getRandomValues), not Math.random(). 32 random bytes base64url-encoded gives 43 characters.
Omitting or not validating the state parameter: The state parameter prevents CSRF. Generate it randomly, include in the auth request, and validate it exactly matches on the redirect.

Dépannage指引

If the authorization server rejects the token request with 'invalid_grant', verify the code_verifier matches the code_challenge used in the authorization request.
For SPAs, consider using the Backend-For-Frontend (BFF) pattern instead of storing tokens in the browser, which is more secure than pure PKCE in the browser.
If using refresh tokens, implement token rotation (issue a new refresh token on each use) and detect reuse to revoke the token family.

Limites de sécurité

PKCE protects the authorization code exchange but does not protect the access token from XSS in the browser — use BFF pattern for higher security.
All token validation happens locally; the client never sends the code verifier to any party except the authorization server.
Access tokens in localStorage are vulnerable to XSS — prefer in-memory storage with silent refresh via refresh token.